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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH , : 
Plaintiff/Appellee, : 
vs. : 
ROBERT BERNERT, : Case No. 20030329 -CA 
Defendant/Appellant. : 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
This appeal is from a conditional plea of guilty to one count of Driving Under 
the Influence of Alcohol and/or Drugs (with priors), a third-degree felony in violation 
of U.C.A. 41-6-44. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES ON APPEAL AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
POINT I 
DID THE TRIAL COURT ERR IN DENYING THE 
DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR DISMISSAL ON THE GROUNDS 
OF DOUBLE JEOPARDY? 
STANDARD OF REVIEW: This issue was properly preserved for appeal by 
the filing of a motion to dismiss (R. 33), and by entering a conditional plea reserving 
the right to appeal the courts decision on the motion. (R. 83/tab3/4) This Court 
reviews this issue for correctness, as it is a question of law. See State v. Horrocks, 17 
P.3d 1145, 1148 (Utah Ct. App. 2001) where the Court stated: "[T]he issue before us 
is whether double jeopardy precludes the reprosecution of defendant in this action. A 
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trial court's decision to grant or deny a motion to dismiss presents a question of law, 
which we review for correctness. See State v. Amoroso, 1999 UT App 60,]f 6, 975 
P.2d 505, cert, denied, 994 P.2d 1271 (Utah 1999)." 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES 
UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION 
FIFTH AMENDMENT 
No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous crime, unless 
on a presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury, except in cases arising in the land or 
naval forces, or in the Militia, when in actual service in time of War or public danger; 
nor shall any person be subject for the same offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life 
or limb; nor shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself, 
nor be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor shall 
private property be taken for public use, without just compensation. 
UTAH CONSITITUION 
ARTICLE I, SECTION 12. [RIGHTS OF ACCUSED PERSONS.] 
In criminal prosecutions the accused shall have the right to appear and defend in 
person and by counsel, to demand the nature and cause of the accusation against him, 
to have a copy thereof, to testify in his own behalf, to be confronted by the witnesses 
against him, to have compulsory process to compel the attendance of witnesses in his 
own behalf, to have a speedy public trial by an impartial jury of the county or district 
in which the offense is alleged to have been committed, and the right to appeal in all 
cases. In no instance shall any accused person, before final judgment, be compelled to 
advance money or fees to secure the rights herein guaranteed. The accused shall not 
be compelled to give evidence against himself; a wife shall not be compelled to testify 
against her husband, nor a husband against his wife, nor shall any person be twice put 
in jeopardy for the same offense. 
Where the defendant is otherwise entitled to a preliminary examination, the 
function of that examination is limited to determining whether probable cause exists 
unless otherwise provided by statute. Nothing in this constitution shall preclude the 
use of reliable hearsay evidence as defined by statute or rule in whole or in part at any 
preliminary examination to determine probable cause or at any pretrial proceeding 
with respect to release of the defendant if appropriate discovery is allowed as defined 
by statute or rule. 
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UTAH CODE ANNOTATED 
Section 41-6-44. Driving under the influence of alcohol, drugs, or a combination of 
both or with specified or unsafe blood alcohol concentration — Measurement of blood 
or breath alcohol — Criminal punishment — Arrest without warrant — Penalties — 
Suspension or revocation of license. 
(1) As used in this section: 
(a) "conviction" means any conviction for a violation of: 
(i) this section; 
(ii) alcohol, any drug, or a combination of both-related reckless driving under 
Subsections (9) and (10); 
(iii) Section 41-6-44.6, driving with any measurable controlled substance that is 
taken illegally in the body; 
(iv) local ordinances similar to this section or alcohol, any drug, or a combination of 
both-related reckless driving adopted in compliance with Section 41-6-43; 
(v) automobile homicide under Section 76-5-207; or 
(vi) a violation described in Subsections (l)(a)(i) through (v), which judgment of 
conviction is reduced under Section 76-3-402; or 
(vii) statutes or ordinances in effect in any other state, the United States, or any 
district, possession, or territory of the United States which would constitute a violation 
of this section or alcohol, any drug, or a combination of both-related reckless driving 
if committed in this state, including punishments administered under 10 U.S.C. § 815; 
(b) "educational series" means an educational series obtained at a substance abuse 
program that is approved by the Board of Substance Abuse and Mental Health in 
accordance with Section 62A-15-105; 
(c) "screening and assessment" means a substance abuse addiction and dependency 
screening and assessment obtained at a substance abuse program 
that is approved by the Board of Substance Abuse and Mental Health in 
accordance with Section 62A-15-105; 
(d) "serious bodily injury" means bodily injury that creates or causes serious 
permanent disfigurement, protracted loss or impairment of the function of any bodily 
member or organ, or creates a substantial risk of death; 
(e) "substance abuse treatment" means treatment obtained at a substance abuse 
program that is approved by the Board of Substance Abuse and Mental Health in 
accordance with Section 62A-15-105; 
(f) "substance abuse treatment program" means a state licensed substance abuse 
program; 
(g) a violation of this section includes a violation under a local ordinance similar to 
this section adopted in compliance with Section 41-6-43; and 
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Section 76-1-403(4) Former prosecution barring subsequent prosecution for 
offense out of same episode. 
(4) There is an improper termination of prosecution if the termination takes 
place before the verdict, is for reasons not amounting to an acquittal, and takes 
place after a jury has been impaneled and sworn to try the defendant, or, if the 
jury trial is waived, after the first witness is sworn. However, termination of 
prosecution is not improper if: 
(a) The defendant consents to the termination; or 
(b) The defendant waives his right to object to the termination; 
(c) The court finds and states for the record that the termination is necessary 
because: 
(i) It is physically impossible to proceed with the trial in conformity with the 
law; or 
(ii) There is a legal defect in the proceeding not attributable to the state that 
would make any judgment entered upon a verdict reversible as a matter of law; or 
(iii) Prejudicial conduct in or out of the courtroom not attributable to the state 
makes it impossible to proceed with the trial without injustice to the defendant or 
the state; or 
(iv) The jury is unable to agree upon a verdict; or 
(v) False statements of a juror on voir dire prevent a fair trial. 
UTAH RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: 
RULE 11 PLEAS: 
(a) Upon arraignment, except for an infraction, a defendant shall be represented by 
counsel, unless the defendant waives counsel in open court. The defendant shall not 
be required to plead until the defendant has had a reasonable time to confer with 
counsel. 
(b) A defendant may plead not guilty, guilty, no contest, not guilty by reason of 
insanity, or guilty and mentally ill. A defendant may plead in the alternative not guilty 
or not guilty by reason of insanity. If a defendant refuses to plead or if a defendant 
corporation fails to appear, the court shall enter a plea of not guilty. 
(c) A defendant may plead no contest only with the consent of the court. 
(d) When a defendant enters a plea of not guilty, the case shall forthwith be set for 
trial. A defendant unable to make bail shall be given a preference for an early trial. In 
cases other than felonies the court shall advise the defendant, or counsel, of the 
requirements for making a written demand for a jury trial. 
(e) The court may refuse to accept a plea of guilty, no contest or guilty and mentally 
ill, and may not accept the plea until the court has found: 
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(1) if the defendant is not represented by counsel, he or she has knowingly waived 
the right to counsel and does not desire counsel; 
(2) the plea is voluntarily made; 
(3) the defendant knows of the right to the presumption of innocence, the right 
against compulsory self-incrimination, the right to a speedy public trial before an 
impartial jury, the right to confront and cross-examine in open court the prosecution 
witnesses, the right to compel the attendance of defense witnesses, and that by 
entering the plea, these rights are waived; 
(4) (A) the defendant understands the nature and elements of the offense to which the 
plea is entered, that upon trial the prosecution would have the burden of proving each 
of those elements beyond a reasonable doubt, and that the plea is an 
admission of all those elements; 
(B) there is a factual basis for the plea. A factual basis is sufficient if it establishes 
that the charged crime was actually committed by the defendant or, if the defendant 
refuses or is otherwise unable to admit culpability, that the prosecution has sufficient 
evidence to establish a substantial risk of conviction; 
(5) the defendant knows the minimum and maximum sentence, and if applicable, the 
minimum mandatory nature of the minimum sentence, that may be imposed for each 
offense to which a plea is entered, including the possibility of the imposition of 
consecutive sentences; 
(6) if the tendered plea is a result of a prior plea discussion and plea agreement, and 
if so, what agreement has been reached; 
(7) the defendant has been advised of the time limits for filing any motion to 
withdraw the plea; and 
(8) the defendant has been advised that the right of appeal is limited. 
These findings may be based on questioning of the defendant on the record or, if 
used, a written statement reciting these factors after the court has established that the 
defendant has read, understood, and acknowledged the contents of the statement. If 
the defendant cannot understand the English language, it will be sufficient that the 
statement has been read or translated to the defendant. 
Unless specifically required by statute or rule, a court is not required to inquire into 
or advise concerning any collateral consequences of a plea. 
(f) Failure to advise the defendant of the time limits for filing any motion to 
withdraw a plea of guilty, no contest or guilty and mentally ill is not a ground for 
setting the plea aside, but may be the ground for extending the time to make a motion 
under Section 77-13-6. 
RULE 22. SENTENCE, JUDGMENT AND COMMITMENT: 
(a) Upon the entry of a plea or verdict of guilty or plea of no contest, the court shall 
set a time for imposing sentence which shall be not less than two nor more than 45 
6 
days after the verdict or plea, unless the court, with the concurrence of the defendant, 
otherwise orders. Pending sentence, the court may commit the defendant or may 
continue or alter bail or recognizance. 
Before imposing sentence the court shall afford the defendant an opportunity to 
make a statement and to present any information in mitigation of punishment, or to 
show any legal cause why sentence should not be imposed. The prosecuting attorney 
shall also be given an opportunity to present any information material to the 
imposition of sentence. 
(b) On the same grounds that a defendant may be tried in defendant's absence, 
defendant may likewise be sentenced in defendant's absence. If a defendant fails to 
appear for sentence, a warrant for defendant's arrest may be issued by the court. 
(c) Upon a verdict or plea of guilty or plea of no contest, the court shall impose 
sentence and shall enter a judgment of conviction which shall include the plea or the 
verdict, if any, and the sentence. Following imposition of sentence, the court 
shall advise the defendant of defendant's right to appeal and the time within which any 
appeal shall be filed. 
(d) When a jail or prison sentence is imposed, the court shall issue its commitment 
setting forth the sentence. The officer delivering the defendant to the jail or prison 
shall deliver a true copy of the commitment to the jail or prison and shall make the 
officer's return on the commitment and file it with the court. 
(e) The court may correct an illegal sentence, or a sentence imposed in an illegal 
manner, at any time. 
(f) Upon a verdict or plea of guilty and mentally ill, the court shall impose sentence 
in accordance with Title 77, Chapter 16a, Utah Code. If the court retains jurisdiction 
over a mentally ill offender committed to the Department of Human Services as 
provided by Utah Code Ann. § 77-16a-202(l)(b), the court shall so specify in the 
sentencing order. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
The defendant was originally charged with a Class B. Misdemeanor Driving 
Under the Influence of Alcohol in violation of U.C.A. §41-6-44. He was represented 
by counsel Daniel Cragun at video arraignments on April 22, 2002 and after a 
thorough Rule 11 colloquy pled guilty to the charge. After the plea was taken, and 
prior to sentence, Judge West inquired of the defendant as to his prior record and it 
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was discovered that the defendant had two prior DUI convictions. At that point 
Ogden City Attorney Paul Olds moved the court to "not accept the guilty plea." Judge 
West told Mr. Olds that he didn't believe that he could do that, but continued the case 
for one day for "disposition". On April 23, 2002, during the video calendar, and in the 
absence of the defendant or counsel, the city moved the court to dismiss the case 
against Mr. Bernert because the State had filed a single count information on April 23, 
2002 with the offense of Driving Under the Influence of Alcohol and/or Drugs (with 
priors), a third-degree felony in violation of U.C.A.§41-6-44. The court, without any 
further inquiry, dismissed the misdemeanor and allowed the filing of the felony DUI. 
On April 29, 2002 the defendant made an initial appearance and the information was 
read. On July 1, 2002, the defendant was present for his scheduled preliminary 
hearing, but upon advice of counsel waived his preliminary hearing. On September 5, 
2002 the defendant filed a motion to dismiss together with accompanying 
memorandum on the grounds of double jeopardy. 
After three hearings on the motion, (October 3, October 23, and November 25, 
2002) the court ruled that the defendants motion for dismissal on the grounds of 
double jeopardy would be denied, and the case would proceed as a felony. The 
defendant appeared for a pretrial hearing on January 23, 2003 at which time he 
entered a conditional plea of guilty to the charge specifically reserving the right to 
appeal the double jeopardy issue. The defendant was sentenced to an indeterminate 0-
5 year sentence to the Utah State Prison on March 20, 2003. 
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The judgment and conviction was entered on March 25, 2003 and the defendant 
filed his notice of appeal on April 15, 2003. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
The defendant was originally charged with a Class B. Misdemeanor of Driving 
Under the Influence of Alcohol in violation of U.C.A. §41-6-44. (Supplement 
transcript from April 22, 23 2002/1) He was represented by attorney Daniel Cragun at 
video arraignments on April 22, 2002 and after a thorough Rule 11 colloquy, and 
pursuant to the advise of his counsel, pled guilty to the charge. (Supplement transcript 
from April 22, 23 2002/2-4) The trial court, Judge Brent West, stated, "Alright, the 
Court will make a finding that this plea has been knowingly and voluntarily entered 
into to the charge of DUI. How do you plead?" (Supplement transcript from April 22, 
23 2002/4) The defendant then said, "I plead guilty, Your Honor." (Supplement 
transcript from April 22, 23 2002/4) The trial court asked, "Is there a breath or blood 
test?" to which the prosecutor answered, "Your Honor, there may be but I don't have 
it." (Supplement transcript from April 22, 23 2002/4) The trial court then asked, 
"Recommendations, Counsel?" (Supplement transcript from April 22, 23 2002/4) 
Judge West inquired of the defendant as to his prior record and it was discovered that 
the defendant had two prior DUI convictions. At that point Ogden City Attorney Paul 
Olds moved the court to "not accept the guilty plea." (Supplement transcript from 
April 22, 23 2002/5) Judge West stated, "At this point I'm going to continue it over 
one day. We'll see if the city is going to stay with the charges or if they're going to 
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file it as a felony. He's already entered his plea." (Supplement transcript from April 
22, 23 2002/5). The court stated, "I don't know if the city can do that but I'm going to 
continue it over one day and think about it. (Supplement transcript from April 22, 23 
2002/5) 
The next morning, On April 23, 2002, during the video calendar, before a 
different judge, Judge Parley R. Baldwin, and in the absence of the defendant or 
defense counsel, the city made the following request: "Your Honor, well, what I asked 
yesterday - and if there's a problem with this let me know. What I asked yesterday is 
that the Court refuse to accept his plea which is, it's my understanding is not a 
problem and that then the city is dismissing this as long as the county has filed." 
(Supplement transcript from April 22, 23 2002/1) Judge Baldwin, without any further 
inquiry, without contact with the defendant or his counsel, and without any finding, 
dismissed the misdemeanor. (Supplement transcript from April 22, 23 2002/1) 
The State filed a single count information dated April 23, 2002 alleging the 
defendant had committed the offense of Driving Under the Influence of Alcohol 
and/or Drugs (with priors), a third-degree felony in violation of U.C.A. 41-6-44. On 
May 2, 2002, after the defendant made an initial appearance and the information was 
read. (R. 15) After several continuances, on July 1, 2002, the defendant was present 
for his scheduled preliminary hearing, but upon advice of counsel waived his 
preliminary hearing. (R. 25) On September 5, 2002 the defendant filed a motion to 
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dismiss together with accompanying memorandum on the grounds of double 
jeopardy.(R. 33) 
The original motion hearing on October 3, 2002 before Judge Lyon resulted in 
the setting of a hearing before Judge West for a determination of whether or not Judge 
West had accepted the plea.(R. 83/5) 
The hearing before Judge West occurred on October 23, 2002 at which time 
Judge West heard brief arguments of counsel. Defense attorney Snider noted that in a 
previous DUI case shortly before the hearing the court did not say the words I accept 
the plea. Mr. Snider, in giving a description of the plea in the previous case stated, 
"You never actually [said] the words I accept the plea in Mr. Hutchison's case, just a 
second ago with Counsel about 10 or 15 minutes ago, you don't do that on a regular 
basis." (R 83/tabl/2). Mr. Snider went on, "But what you do do is before you start to 
impose the sentence, you say, is there anything anyone wants to say?" (R. 83/tabl/2) 
Judge West then made a finding, "My honest opinion is I took the plea but I never 
accepted it, I never intended to go ahead and sentence on the particular issues." (R. 
83/tabl/3) Judge West further noted, "I did not know at that point at what point the 
State could go kings V . " (R. 83/tabl/3) Judge West finally stated, "So objectively, 
legally, I'm of the opinion I did not accept his plea in that particular situation. You 
have pointed out a good point. Maybe I ought to reconsider how I do things and make 
the statement that the plea is accepted but I really felt that I was not accepting this 
plea at that point." (R. 83/tabl/4) 
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On November 25, 2002, Judge Lyon made a ruling on the defendant's double 
jeopardy and due process motions denying both. The court ruled, "the mere tendering 
of the plea does not create jeopardy, that that plea must be accepted by the court, was 
not accepted, therefore, the plea could be rejected which Judge Baldwin subsequently 
did and therefore, it is this court's ruling that because the jeopardy never attached it 
could be dismissed and could be re-filed by the State as a felony and I'm going to 
permit that." (R. 83/tab2/5) 
On January 23, 2003 the defendant entered a guilty plea to the felony DUI. (R. 
83/tab3/6) This guilty plea was a conditional plea reserving the right to appeal the 
double jeopardy and due process claims previously ruled upon (R. 83/tab3/l,4) 
The defendant was sentenced to an indeterminate term of 0-5 years in the Utah 
State Prison on March 20, 2003. (R. 83/tab4/2) 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
The determinative issue of the defendant on appeal is whether the defendant 
had entered his plea to a misdemeanor DUI, whether jeopardy had attached, and 
therefore whether the subsequent dismissal of the DUI, and later filing of a felony 
DUI violated the defendant's constitutional rights. The defendant contends that the 
trial court erred in making a ruling, six months after the fact, that it had not accepted 
his guilty plea, thereby ratifying another judge's dismissal of the misdemeanor. That 
dismissal was done in the absence of the defendant or counsel, and without the 
making of any findings of irregularity or manifest necessity. 
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The defendant contends that allowing the dismissal of the misdemeanor 
DUI based solely on the grounds that the prosecutor failed to check into the 
defendant's past record prior to filing the charging documents is procedurally wrong, 
and violates his constitutional rights. Furthermore, the defendant believes that 
allowing such withdrawal of his guilty plea would set a dangerous precedent that 
could throw the Utah Court system into disarray. 
Finally, the defendant contends that the trial court erred in determining that the 
Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure allowed the court, after the plea was entered, to 
withdraw the plea on the grounds that the court had not accepted the plea and that the 
court was factually erroneous in asserting the plea had not been accepted wherein the 
court had clearly asked for sentencing recommendations after the plea was entered. 
ARGUMENT 
THE FIFTH AMENDMENT TO THE UNITED STATES 
CONSTITUTION AND ARTICLE I SECTION 12 OF THE UTAH 
CONSTITUTION PROHIBIT THE PROSECUTION OF THE 
FELONY CHARGE AS A VIOLATION OF THE DOUBLE 
JEOPARDY CLAUSE OF THE RESPECTIVE CONSTITUTIONS 
The Fifth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States, together with 
Article I Section 12 of the Constitution of the State of Utah provide that no person 
shall "be subject for the same offence or be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb." This 
concept has always been held inviolate regardless of whether the jeopardy is the result 
of a trial or a guilty plea. 
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During the taking of the guilty plea to a misdemeanor DUI in the present case, 
the trial court, Judge Brent West, stated, "Alright, the Court will make a finding that 
this plea has been knowingly and voluntarily entered into to the charge of DUI. How 
do you plead?" (Supplement transcript from April 22, 23 2002/4) The defendant then 
said, "I plead guilty, Your Honor." (Supplement transcript from April 22, 23 2002/4) 
The trial court asked, "Is there a breath or blood test?" to which the prosecutor 
answered, "Your Honor, there may be but I don't have it." (Supplement transcript 
from April 22, 23 2002/4) The trial court then asked, "Recommendations, Counsel?" 
(Supplement transcript from April 22, 23 2002/4) A review of the record in Judge 
West's court shows that this is his typical practice in taking pleas of guilty. He does 
not recite the phraseology of "accepting" pleas but his request for "recommendations" 
from counsel is clear that the plea has been accepted and he is now moving to the 
sentencing phase of the proceeding. It was then, in preparation for sentencing, that 
Judge West inquired of the defendant as to his prior record and it was discovered that 
the defendant had two prior DUI convictions. At that point Ogden City Attorney Paul 
Olds moved the court to "not accept the guilty plea." (Supplement transcript from 
April 22, 23 2002/5) Judge West stated, "At this point I'm going to continue it over 
one day. We'll see if the city is going to stay with the charges or if they're going to 
file it as a felony. He's already entered his plea." (Supplement transcript from April 
22, 23 2002/5). 
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Given the manner in which the plea was taken, as described above, there are 
two possible grounds for the trial court's withdrawal of the defendant's guilty plea. 
First, the trial court could withdraw the guilty plea under the theory of a misplea. 
Second, the trial court could make a finding that the plea was not accepted, and 
therefore withdraw the plea of guilty, and dismiss the case, allowing for the refiling of 
the felony. Although it is presumed that the trial court relied on the latter of those two 
methods1, the defendant will make an analysis of both. 
A. WITHDRAWAL OF PLEA UNDER THE THEORY OF 
A MISPLEA: 
Both the United States Supreme Court as well as the Utah Supreme Court have 
ruled on numerous occasions that "jeopardy attached when a court accepts a guilty 
plea." State v. Kay, 111 P.2d 1294, 1302 (Utah 1986). The U S. Supreme Court, in 
the case of United States v. Jenkins, 420 U.S. 358, 366 (1975) held: "A general 
finding of guilt by a judge may be analogized to a verdict of "guilty" returned by a 
jury.2 
1
 On November 25, 2002, Judge Lyon made a ruling on the defendant's double 
jeopardy and due process motions denying both. The court ruled, "the mere tendering 
of the plea does not create jeopardy, that that plea must be accepted by the court, was 
not accepted, therefore, the plea could be rejected which Judge Baldwin subsequently 
did and therefore, it is this court's ruling that because the jeopardy never attached it 
could be dismissed and could be re-filed by the State as a felony and I'm going to 
permit that." (R. 83/tab2/5 emphasis added) 
2
 See also Kring v. Missouri, 107 U.S. 221, 2 S.Ct. 443, 27 L.Ed. 506 (1983): United 
States v. Cruz J09 F.2d 111, 113 (1st Cir. 1983) 
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Furthermore, the Court in State v. Kay has held that due to the waiver of 
numerous constitutional rights by a defendant in a guilty plea, "a trial court may not 
simply disregard a plea agreement unless the defendant knowingly waives his right to 
be free from jeopardy through a voluntary withdrawal of the plea." (Id at 1303) 
Notwithstanding the above-cited law, the State, as well as the Federal Courts 
have allowed, in very limited circumstances, a court to declare a misplea, thereby 
allowing the court to withdraw the defendants plea of guilty.3 The limitations on such 
an action, however, have been significant. The Court in the case of State v. Kay, 111 
P.2d 1294, 1303 (Utah 1986) held: 
Jeopardy attaches upon acceptance of the guilty plea, but the constitution 
allows the trial court to rescind its acceptance at any time before 
sentencing and judgment upon a showing of "manifest necessity" - the 
standard for declaring a mistrial over the defendant's objection. 
(Emphasis added, see also United States v. Cruz, 709 F.2d 111, 113 (1st 
Cir. 1983)) 
In the case of State v. HorrocksM P.3d 1145 (Ut App 2001) the court did 
declare a misplea in a case in which the defendant was orally sentenced, apparently in 
conflict with the above ruling. In that case however, the Court found that the Justice 
Court Clerk declared a misplea before any "of the information about the plea and 
sentence was entered into the court's computer system and no final judgment was ever 
created or signed." (Id at page 1147) 
3
 It is presumed that this was the basis for the City's motion to vacate the plea. 
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In the limited number of cases where the court has allowed the entry of a 
misplea, the constitutional limitations on such a declaration have been narrowly 
defined4. The court in State v. Kay, held "that once the court or prosecution has 
entered into a plea agreement and that plea has been accepted and entered, neither one 
may unilaterally withdraw from the agreement without a showing that facts analogous 
to those warranting a mistrial exist." (Id at 1304) The Court then delineated only two 
circumstances which rise to that level. The Court in State v. Kay held "a misplea can 
properly be granted where obvious reversible error has been committed", and "where 
some fraud or deception by one party leads to the acceptance of the plea agreement by 
the other party or the court". (Id at 1305) Finally, a misplea cannot be granted if it 
results in prejudice to the defendant, an assessment that does not need to be reached in 
the case at bar. 
This Court in the case of State v. Nilson, 854 P.2d 1029 (Utah App. 1993) has 
ruled that once jeopardy attaches, only limited circumstances allow subsequent 
prosecution. These limited circumstances include those set forth in Utah Code Ann. § 
76-1-403(4). In State v. Nilson the Court held: "The State could reprosecute if the 
termination was not for reasons 'amounting to an acquittal,' or if the defendant 
consented to the termination". (Id. at 1032) The relevant facts of State v. Nilson 
involved an issue as to jeopardy, where the prosecution's witness testified to the 
violation happening outside the time parameters charged in the information. The 
4
 See United States v. Jorn, 400 U.S. 470, 482 (1971) where the court held that a 
mistrial will not be allowed when "compelled by bad-faith prosecutorial conduct 
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prosecutor then moved to dismiss the case and the later refilling was objected to on 
grounds of double jeopardy. The court dismissed the new filing as a double jeopardy 
violation. 
Furthermore, the Court in the case of State v. Ambrose, 598 P.2d 354, 361 
(Utah 1979) held: 'The double jeopardy protection is not so ephemeral that it 
vanishes if an accused does not anticipate and object to every unexpected action on 
the part of the court." 
In the present case, the judge's vacation of the plea fails on all grounds. First, 
the Defendant pled guilty and the trial court asked for recommendations for 
sentencing in the normal course. It was only after the court told the prosecutor that the 
defendant had several prior DUFs that the prosecutor moved for the court not to 
accept the plea. Second, the prosecution cannot show the "manifest necessity" 
required to overcome the double jeopardy protection. The plea in the present case, 
unlike in Kay or Horrock, did not result from fraud or deception by the Defendant. 
The Defendant appeared in court on the video calendar, and was represented by 
counsel. The City was also represented by counsel, and the defendant entered his plea 
of guilty. After the court asked for recommendations for sentencing, the prosecutor 
made the motion to not accept the plea. The case was then continued, and on the video 
calendar the next day, a different judge, granted the motion, and dismissed the case. 
This dismissal was accomplished without a hearing and without the presence of the 
Defendant or his counsel. The court did not make a finding of manifest necessity, nor 
aimed at triggering a mistrial in order to get another day in court." 
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was the Defendant given the opportunity to object or present evidence to rebut that 
claim. The fact that the Defendant did not object to the withdrawal cannot be said to 
constitute a silent waiver since such a policy was prohibited in State v. Ambrose. 
B. WITHDRAWAL OF PLEA UNDER THE THEORY 
THAT THE PLEA WAS NOT ACCEPTED. 
The defendant's motion to dismiss on the grounds of double jeopardy was 
denied by the trial court on the grounds that the plea was never accepted by Judge 
West during the video arraignment. This ruling, was based on a finding by Judge West 
at the hearing on October 23, 2002. At the conclusion of that hearing Judge West 
stated, "So objectively, legally, I'm of the opinion I did not accept his plea in that 
particular situation. You have pointed out a good point. Maybe I ought to reconsider 
how I do things and make the statement that the plea is accepted but I really felt that I 
was not accepting this plea at that point." (R. 83/tabl/4) 
The trial court apparently made this ruling on the erroneous reading of Utah 
Rules of Criminal Procedure, Rule 11(e), which reads in relevant part: "The court may 
refuse to accept a plea of guilty, no contest or guilty and mentally ill, and may not 
accept the plea until the court has found...". Although the trial court determined that 
this rule allows a court to refuse to accept a plea of guilty, the rule actually provides 
for the refusal only when a proper Rule 11 colloquy has not been given. Furthermore, 
Rule 11(b) provides "A defendant may plead not guilty, guilty, no contest, not guilty 
by reason of insanity, or guilty and mentally ill", giving a defendant the right to plead 
guilty. Finally, Rule 22(a) provides: 
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Upon the entry of a plea or verdict of guilty or plea of no contest, 
the court shall set a time for imposing sentence which shall be not less 
than two nor more than 45 days after the verdict or plea, unless the court, 
with the concurrence of the defendant, otherwise orders. Before 
imposing sentence the court shall afford the defendant an opportunity to 
make a statement and to present any information in mitigation of 
punishment, or to show any legal cause why sentence should not be 
imposed.(emphasis added) 
Therefore, once a plea has been entered, as it was in the case at bar5, the court has a 
duty to thereafter make arrangements for imposing sentence. 
The Utah Court of Appeals in the case of State v. Horrocks 17 P.3d 1145, 1149 
(Ut App 2001) gives some guidance with regards to the order in which a plea is 
accepted and entered. In that case the Court stated: 
The Utah Supreme Court has observed that it is well settled "that 
jeopardy attaches when a court accepts a guilty plea and that the entry of 
the plea, rather than the actual imposition of the sentence, is the critical 
moment for determining jeopardy." (Citing State v. Kay, 111 P.2d 1294, 
1302 (Utah 1986)) (emphasis added) 
The 5th Amendment to the Constitution of the United States as well as Article 1 
Section 12 of the Constitution of the State of Utah prohibit a criminal defendant from 
twice being put into jeopardy. Both the Federal as well as the State Appellate Courts 
have routinely upheld this prohibition. In the case of Grady v. Corbin6, 495 U.S. 508, 
(1990) the Supreme Court dealt with a case where a defendant was involved in a DUI 
that resulted in the death of a victim. Due to prosecutor error, the defendant was 
5
 The trial court, immediately after the plea was tendered stated: "He's already entered 
his plea." (R. 84/5) 
6
 Grady v. Corbin, 495 U.S. 508, (1990) was overruled on other grounds. The Grady 
case introduced a "same conduct" test which was overruled by United States v. Dixon, 
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charged and pled guilty to a DUI and related traffic offense in Justice Court. The State 
then sought to prosecute the defendant on the reckless manslaughter and criminally 
negligent homicide charges. The Court affirmed the Appellate Courts application of 
the double jeopardy clause, which barred prosecution of the later charges. In that case 
the Court held: 
Drunken driving is a national tragedy. Prosecutors' offices are often 
overworked and may not always have the time to monitor seemingly 
minor cases as they wind through the judicial system. But these facts 
cannot excuse the need for scrupulous adherence to our constitutional 
principles.... With adequate preparation and foresight, the State could 
have prosecuted [the defendant] for the offenses charged in the traffic 
tickets and the subsequent indictment in a single proceeding, thereby 
avoiding this double jeopardy question. We have concluded that the 
Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment demands application of 
the standard announced today, but we are confident that with proper 
planning and attention prosecutors will be able to meet this standard and 
bring to justice those who make our Nation's roads unsafe. {Grady v. 
Corbin, at 524) 
The question for this Court to decide in the case at bar is whether a trial court 
can undo the lack of "adequate preparation and foresight" of the prosecution by 
subsequently ruling that the court had not accepted the plea to the lesser charges. 
Although there is little case law dealing with the issue of what constitutes the 
acceptance of a guilty plea, this Court needs to realize the far-reaching implications of 
allowing a trial court to make that determination 6 months after the fact. Such a 
precedent would undermine the finality of thousands of convictions statewide. 
509 U.S. 688 (1993), which reestablished the "same elements" or "Blockburger" test. 
The case at bar meets the "same elements" test. 
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In the present case the defendant, after a proper Rule 11 colloquy, entered a 
plea of guilty to the misdemeanor DUI. The trial court asked for recommendations for 
sentencing, , an act that can only confirm the acceptance of the plea. The court then 
continued the case for one day after the prosecutor discovered the prior record of the 
defendant and asked the court not to accept the guilty plea. Six months later, the trial 
court was then asked to determine whether or not it had accepted the guilty plea, a 
finding that it made against the defendant. The trial court made this finding on the 
basis that it had not uttered the words "the court accepts the guilty plea." The trial 
court stated "My honest opinion is I took the plea but I never accepted it, I never 
intended to go ahead and sentence on the particular issues." (R. 83/tabl/3) The facts 
of the case belie that assertion. 
In the present case, the trial court had taken the plea and ruled that it was 
entered knowingly and voluntarily. The court then asked for recommendations for 
sentencing, which is apparently the manner in which that trial judge normally 
proceeds , and also the manner prescribed by law . The court never stated that it did 
not accept the plea, but rather continued the case for one day, stating, "He's already 
entered his plea." and, "I don't know if the city can do that but I'm going to continue 
7
 See (R. 83/tabl/2) where defense counsel argued, "But what you do do is before you 
start to impose the sentence, you say, is there anything anyone wants to say?" The 
court did not correct that argument. 
8
 See Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure Rule 22(a), which reads in relevant part, 
"Before imposing sentence the court shall afford the defendant an opportunity to make 
a statement and to present any information in mitigation of punishment, or to show 
any legal cause why sentence should not be imposed." 
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it over one day and think about it. (R. 84/5) Six months later the court made the 
determination that it had not accepted the plea. 
If this Court rules that the trial court can make such a determination months 
after a plea is entered, this Court must, in furtherance of justice, entertain any 
defendants motion to set aside a conviction where the trial court did not say the words 
"the court accepts the guilty plea." 
The Utah Supreme Court in State v. Kay infra has held that the State of Utah 
does not allow a retroactive voiding of a plea to correct error. In that case the Court 
held: 
In view of the conflict among the lower federal courts, the disparate state 
court positions, and the absence of a clear ruling by the United States 
Supreme Court, we do not feel compelled to adopt the strained void ab 
initio analysis. Rather, we are persuaded by the First Circuit's reasoning 
in United States v. Cruz, (State v. Kay at 1303) 
From a policy standpoint this Court needs to reject the prosecutors request to 
retroactively determine whether or not a plea was accepted. If not, every plea in which 
the trial court did not say the words "I accept your plea" will be put into question. If a 
court has not accepted a plea, then any subsequent sentence would have been illegally 
imposed, and therefore subject to a habeas review, or motion to correct an illegal 
sentence which can be brought at any time . The snowball effect that would 
undoubtedly occur could overwhelm the court system. 
9
 Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure Rule 22(e) provides: "The court may correct an 
illegal sentence, or a sentence imposed in an illegal manner, at any time." 
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Unfortunately, in the present case, the prosecutor failed to check the 
defendant's record prior to filing the charging documents. The defendant was brought 
before the district court and properly entered his guilty plea. However, as stated in 
Grady v. Corbin infra, "these facts cannot excuse the need for scrupulous adherence 
to our constitutional principles." (Grady v. Corbin, at 524) The defendant entered his 
plea, jeopardy attached, and any attempt by the trial court or the prosecutor to undo 
the plea 6 months after the fact should be barred by the constitutional provisions of 
double jeopardy. 
The constitutional protections against double jeopardy and due process as 
guaranteed by both the United States and the Utah constitutions prohibit the District 
Court from prosecuting the felony DUI on jurisdictional grounds. Any conviction and 
sentence are therefore void. 
CONCLUSION 
Based upon the foregoing, the defendant respectfully requests this court reverse 
the defendant's conviction, dismiss the felony charge, and remand the case back to the 
district court to impose sentence on the misdemeanor DUI. 
DATED this '•'day of October, 2003. i 
• 
ISANDALL W. TO^HARDS 
Attorney for Appellant 
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SECOND DISTRICT COURT - OGDEN COURT 
WEBER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
ROBERT J BERNERT, 
Defendant. 
MINUTES 
SENTENCE, JUDGMENT, COMMITMENT 
Case No: 021901715 FS 
Judge: MICHAEL D. LYON h,r 
Date: March 20, 2 003 : "v 
PRESENT 
Clerk: maureem 
Prosecutor: DEAN SAUNDERS 
Defendant 
Defendant's Attorney(s): KENT E SNIDER 
DEFENDANT INFORMATION 
Date of birth: April 17, 1958 
Video 
Tape Number: L3/20/03 Tape Count: 02:50 
CHARGES 
1. DRIVING UNDER THE INFLUENCE OF ALC/DRUGS - 3rd Degree Felony 
- Disposition: 01/23/2003 Guilty 
SENTENCE PRISON 
Based on the defendant's conviction of DRIVING UNDER THE INFLUENCE 
OF ALC/DRUGS a 3rd Degree Felony, the defendant is sentenced to an 
indeterminate term of not to exceed five years in the Utah State 
Prison. 
COMMITMENT is to begin immediately. 
To the WEBER County Sheriff: The defendant is remanded to your 
custody for transportation to the Utah State Prison where the 
defendant will be confined. 
The Defendant is to report by March 24, 2003 by 5:00 pm. 
Page 1 075 
Case No: 021901715 
Date: Mar 20, 2003 
Credit is granted for time served. 
Credit is granted for 1 dayGsJ previously served. 
Dated this 
- *-—• I * v - — • — t 
X 
^ d a y of 4\(Lt.ik. 20^ 
IHAEITDTLYON7 MIC AEL 
District Court Judgfe / 
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ADDENDUM B 
SANDRA L. CORP 4411 
WEBER COUNTY ATTORNEY'S OFFICE 
2380 WASHINGTON BLVD., 2ND FLOOR 
OGDEN, UTAH 84401 
TELEPHONE: (801) 399-8377 
IN THE SECOND DISTRICT COURT, WEBER COUNTY, V j 
STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
ROBERT J. BERNERT, 
Defendant. 
FINDINGS OF FACT ON ISSUE 
OF PRIOR PLEA PROCEEDINGS 
BEFORE JUDGE W. BRENT 
WEST 
CaseNo.021901715 
Judge: MICHAEL D. LYON 
[W. BRENT WEST] 
This case was referred to this Court for clarification of an issue of fact regarding a prior 
plea proceeding in a dismissed Ogden City case involving the same offense. The parties agreed 
that this Court should clarify whether it had accepted a plea of guilty to the offense in case 
number 025904348 on April 22, 2002. This Court reviewed the audio tape of the April 22 
hearing and issued its oral findings on October 23, 2002. Counsel for both parties were present. 
This Court now enters the following: 
1. Ogden City charged defendant with Driving Under the Influence of Alcohol, a class B 
misdemeanor, based upon citation # D449693 dated April 20, 2002. 
2. Defendant appeared before this Court at video arraignments to answer the charge on 
April 22, 2002 in case number 025904348. 
3. Defendant stated that he pleaded guilty to the charge at that time. 
® NOV - u 
&T COURT 
A °: I? 
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4. This Court conducted a Rule 11 colloquy, found that the plea was knowing and 
voluntary, and then inquired about Defendant's prior record but did not indicate acceptance of 
the plea. 
5. Prior to a sentence being imposed, the City moved to dismiss the case so that it could 
be filed by the Weber County Attorney's Office as a third degree felony based upon Defendant's 
prior record. 
6. This Court stayed the proceedings and continued the matter one day to allow the City 
to further argue its motion to dismiss. 
7. This Court did not accept Defendant's guilty plea on April 22, 2002. 
DATED this ^ day of November, 2002. 
BY THE COU 
W. BRENT WEST 
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I certify that a copy of the foregoing Findings was mailed to: Kent E. Snider, 
Attorney for Defendant, 289 24th Street, Ogden, UT 84401 this Z*T day of October, 2002. 
ADDENDUM C 
SECOND DISTRICT COURT - OGDEN COURT 
WEBER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
ROBERT J BERNERT, 
Defendant, 
MINUTES 
INCOURT NOTE 
NOTICE 
Case No: 021901715 FS 
Judge: W. BRENT WEST 
Date: April 22, 2002 
PRESENT 
Clerk: barbaraf 
Prosecutor: NEIDER, CAMILLE L. 
Defendant 
DEFENDANT INFORMATION 
Date of birth: October 26, 1957 
Video 
Tape Number: V02-055 Tape Count: D:1215 
CHARGES 
1. DRIVING UNDER THE INFLUENCE OF ALC/DRUGS - 3rd Degree Felony 
This case was on city portion of video calendar. Defendant enters 
a plea of guilty. The city, upon learning of defendants extensive 
history, stated they would like defendant to withdraw plea and 
transfer case to the State. Information was filed by 
State. 
INITIAL APPEARANCE is scheduled. 
Date: 04/23/2002 
Time: 09:00 a.m. 
Location: Video Room 
Second District Court 
2525 Grant Avenue 
Ogden, UT 84401 
Before Judge: VIDEO IDEO 
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ADDENDUM D 
IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR WEBER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, Case No. 021901715 FS 
Plaintiff, Appellate Case No. 20030329 
ROBERT J. BERNERT, 
Defendant. 
April 22, 2002 
April 23, 2002 
Arraignment before Judge West Page 1 
Review of Plea before Judge Baldwin Tab 1 
CAROLYN ERICKSON, CSR 
CERTIFIED COURT TRANSCRIBER 
1775 E. Ellen Way 
Sandy, Utah 84092 
801-523-1186 
V. > 
"*H p*5*" h ) ' 
For the Plaintiff: 
APPEARANCES 
APRIL 22, 2002 
PAUL H. OLDS 
Odgen City Attorney's Office 
For the Defendant: DANNY CRAGUN 
Public Defender's Office 
* * * 
APRIL 23, 2002 
For the Plaintiff: PAUL H. OLDS 
Odgen City Attorney's Office 
For the Defendant: No appearance 
Defendant not present 
* * * 
Ogden, Utah - April 22, 2002 
JUDGE W. BRENT WEST PRESIDING 
(Transcriber's note: Speaker identification 
may not be accurate with audio recordings) 
P R O C E E D I N G S 
THE COURT: Ogden City versus Robert J. Bernert. 
COURT CLERK: Is Robert J. Bernert your true and 
correct name, sir? 
MR. BERNERT: Robert Jacob Bernert. 
COURT CLERK: Thank you. On April 20th, you've been 
charged with a Class B, driving under the influence of alcohol 
or drugs. 
THE COURT: Class B misdemeanor punishable by a 
maximum of fine of $1,000 and/or six months in the Weber County 
Jail and if you're found guilty or you plead guilty to this 
charge you're required to enroll and complete and pay for an 
alcohol and drug treatment program. It could affect your 
privilege to drive as well as your insurance. 
In addition to that you have to do jail time or 
community service. If it's a first offense and your blood 
alcohol content is .16 or greater you're required to put an 
interlock ignition devise on your car. If it is a second 
offense within a ten year period you're also required to put an 
interlock ignition devise on your car. 
Counsel, have you and he decided how you're going to 
proceed? 
MR. CRAGUN: Yes, Your Honor, (inaudible) Mr. Bernert 
is going to plead guilty to the DUI. 
THE COURT: Is that correct, Mr. Bernert? 
MR. BERNERT: Yes, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: In doing this you're giving up a series of 
constitutional rights. You do have a right to talk to a 
lawyer. You're entitled to a speedy trial. That trial would 
be before a judge or a jury, your choice. At that trial you'd 
have the right to confront or cross exam witnesses; to provide 
a defense and to bring witnesses in on your own behalf. You 
would be entitled to unanimous jury verdict and if you were 
convicted you'd have a right to an appeal. You also have a 
right against self-incrimination which means you don't have to 
plead guilty, sir. You don't have to say or do anything that 
would lead anyone to believe that you've done anything wrong. 
Finally, once you enter your plea you and Mr. Cragun 
have 30 days to file any post-plea motions and there are two of 
those. You have 30 days from the date that you are sentenced 
to file an appeal to ask to have your plea set aside or to do 
both. 
Finally, you are presumed to be innocent. The city 
has the burden of proof. They've got to prove this beyond a 
reasonable doubt in order to convict you. Do you understand 
that? 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
MR. BERNERT: Yes, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: You've gone over this with your attorney 
and this is what you've decided to do? 
MR. BERNERT: Yes, sir, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: This is a voluntary plea on your behalf? 
MR. BERNERT: Yes, sir, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: Have there been any other promises that 
have been made to you, sir? 
MR. BERNERT: No, sir. 
THE COURT: You're doing this of your own free will or 
because it's appropriate or the best you can do or for whatever 
12 i reasons you've decided to enter into this plea arrangement; is 
i 
13 that correct? 
I 
14 J MR. BERNERT: Yes, sir, Your Honor. 
15 | THE COURT: Are you under the influence of any alcohol 
16 or drugs today? 
17 , MR. BERNERT: No, sir, Your Honor. 
I 
18 ' THE COURT: Receiving any kind of medical treatment? 
19 I MR. BERNERT: Just for my detox (inaudible) jail, 
20 other than that I'm fine. 
21 ' THE COURT: Alright. You're not suffering from any 
22 kind of mental illness, you're thinking clearly? 
23 MR. BERNERT: Yes, sir. 
24 THE COURT: You understand the charges that are 
25 ! pending against you as well as the plea negotiation as well as 
3 
1 the penalties that I went over just a few seconds ago? 
2 ! MR. BERNERT: Yes, Your Honor, I do. 
3 THE COURT: Alright, the Court will make a finding 
4 i that this plea has been knowingly and voluntarily entered into 
5 I to the charge of DUI. How do you plead? 
6 I MR. BERNERT: I pled guilty, Your Honor. 
7 J THE COURT: Is there a breath or blood test? 
8 MR. OLDS: Your Honor, there may be but I don't have 
9 it. 
10 I THE COURT: Recommendation, Counsel? 
i 
11 I MR. CRAGUN: Is (inaudible) a blood test? 
12 | THE COURT: No, he didn't have the results yet. 
13 MR. OLDS: Your Honor, this is not his first offense. 
14 He did have an alcohol related reckless prior to this. 
15 I THE COURT: Let's talk about that because I show an 
16 | alcohol related reckless in 1977. I show a DUI conviction for 
17 i - let me get the date here - June 1st, 1990. I show two counts 
18 i of DUI on August 3rd, 1991. I show another DUI in Salt Lake on 
19 | May 13th, 1995. I show another DUI for which he got 180 days 
20 | on June 2nd of 1995. Then I show another DUI and an open 
21 | container and then in Pleasantview I show in 2001, in June 6th, 
22 | a DUI and an open container. So I'm kind of surprised that 
23 I this isn't a Class A or a felony but I show an extensive 
24 I record. 
25 | MR. OLDS: I suppose at this point -
MR. CRAGUN: I spoke to Mr. Bernert and he feels like 
it would be in his best interest to do at least more extensive 
counseling. He's asked his father to (inaudible) -
MR. OLDS: Your Honor, at this point I would move the 
Court not to accept his guilty plea and I'll transfer it to the 
county. 
MR. CRAGUN: - to either make a decision to take this 
matter (inaudible), so we would ask that the Court factor in 
extensive either in-patient or out-patient counseling for his 
drug - or his alcohol problem. 
THE COURT: Mr. Olds has now indicated he's now having 
second thoughts about the plea. He didn't realize the 
extensive record. He wants to transfer it over to the State 
and charge him with a felony. 
Correct? 
MR. OLDS: Yes, it is. 
THE COURT: At this point I'm going to continue it 
over one day. We'll see if the city is going to stay with the 
charges or if they're going to file it as a felony. He's 
, already entered his plea. I don't know if the city can do that 
i 
but I'm going to continue it over one day and think about it. 
i 
I We'll see you two back tomorrow. 
J COURT CLERK: (inaudible) 
THE COURT: Yes. 
j MR. OLDS?: I did that once before with Judge Lyon and 
something about, you know, not to accept the plea. 
COURT CLERK: So what should I calendar that for? 
THE COURT: Disposition. 
(Whereupon the hearing was concluded) 
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Ogden, Utah - May 23, 2002 
JUDGE PARLEY R. BALDWIN PRESIDING 
(Transcriber's note: Speaker identification 
may not be accurate with audio recordings) 
5 | P R O C E E D I N G S 
6 J COURT CLERK: Ogden City versus Robert J. Bernert? 
7 1 MR. ?: Mr. Bernert is out on Pappas bailbond. 
8 | THE COURT: Thank you. 
9 I This is a case where he entered a plea and then it 
10 ! was also filed by the State. 
i 
11 l MR. OLDS: Your Honor, well, what I asked yesterday -
i 
i 
12 | and if there's a problem with this let me know. What I asked 
13 I yesterday is that the Court refuse to accept his plea which is, 
14 | it's my understanding is not a problem and that then the city 
15 | is dismissing this as long as the county has filed. 
16 ; THE COURT: Granted. 
17 j MS. ?: He said that he was going to be given 
l 
18 | a court date and (inaudible) up here in the city on Thursday. 
| 
19 j COURT CLERK: No, because this morning he called and 
20 ' said I was told to call here about a court date and I said call 
I 
21 j after videos and I'll tell you what happened. 
22 j THE COURT: So you need to set it on -
23 j COURT CLERK: I will. 
24 THE COURT: You just need to set it on a State 
I 
25 i calendar. 
1 MS. ?: (inaudible) 
2 THE COURT: Right, 
3 MS. ?: (inaudible) 
4 I (Whereupon the hearing was concluded) 
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ADDENDUM E 
OGDEN, UTAH - OCTOBER 23, 2002 
JUDGE W. BRENT WEST PRESIDING 
P R O C E E D I N G S 
THE COURT: State of Utah v. Robert J. Bernert. Can I 
I see the file please? I not quite sure what - well, I'm sure 
I understand what I'm suppose to do. Is there anything anybody 
wants to tell me about this particular case? Is Mr. Bernert | 
here? 
MR. SNIDER: Mr. Bernert is not here, Your Honor. 
This was set (inaudible) and I told him that we were going to 
be having a hearing before Judge Lyon's hearing tomorrow but I j 
didn't know exactly when we were going to get this in before, | 
Your Honor. | 
THE COURT: Anything else anybody would like to tell | 
me about this? I've listened to the tape. In fact, I remember1 
this case vividly. I know what was going on so if you would j 
{ 
like to address it, go ahead. | 
MR. SNIDER: Obviously it's our position, and the j 
only issue before the Court, Your Honor, is whether or not the > 
Court accepted the plea, just so the Court understands. A | 
couple of things that I would like to point out for the record, I 
Your Honor, is that the Court went through the Rule 11 colloquy | 
and there was no question in regards to whether or not it was | 
i 
made knowing or voluntary and the Court made a specific finding | 
of that. Where the question arose was, the Court never said, I \ 
1 
1 I find that your plea has been made knowing and voluntary and I 
2 I accept the plea. I've been sitting here today listening and 
3 | this Court does not do that until after they have pled and then 
4 
5 
they go through and then you say I accept the plea. You never 
actually - the words I accept the plea in Mr. Hutchinson's 
6 ] case, just a second ago with Counsel about 10 or 15 minutes 
7 [ ago, you don't do that on a regular basis. But what you do do 
8 is before you start to impose the sentence, you say, is there 
9 I anything anyone wants to say? And in fact I think you say that 
10 i in this case and that's our position is that you say "Is there 
I 
11 a blood test?" And the prosecutor says, "We don't have one." 
12 And you say, "Any recommendations, Counsel," as if you are 
i 
13 I prepared to impose the sentence. You would not be prepared to 
14 ! impose sentence if you had not accepted the plea and that our ! 
15 position. i 
16 THE COURT: Okay. Does the State want to be heard? 
17 MS. CORP: Well, Your Honor, I think whether the ' 
18 Court accepted the plea is really within the knowledge of the ' 
19 ! Court and not within the knowledge of the parties or Judge Lyon | 
20 and that's why we're back here. The State feels that there's i 
21 I an argument the State can make regardless of whether the Court 
22 ' accepted the plea. I think that the reason Judge Lyon wanted 
23 ' to know is so that he is not making that decision for Your 
24 Honor and he knows then which legal analysis he has to use. | 
25 So, I think it's really - we're just here to find out what the . 
i i 
i 
i 
I 2 | 
Court thinks it did on that basis. There isn't really much I 
can say. 
THE COURT: I'll be candid. He entered his plea. I 
was surprised that he entered his plea in the first place 
because I was looking at his record at the time that they 
handed up his OR. We had discussed the issue of whether or not 
he was going to be released or not and I had his OR and when I 
asked for the breath test and then I asked for his record, at 
that point the city spoke up and I believe Mr. Olds is on the 
record as saying that he did not want me to accept the plea and 
then there's some shuffling as he checks with the record. My 
honest opinion is I took the plea but I never accepted it, I 
never intended to go ahead and sentence on the particular 
issues. Once the city found out the extensiveness of his 
record, they said we should have filed this as a third degree 
felony. In fact, Mr. Olds said, Judge, we don't want you to 
accept the plea. My final words on the tape was I would 
continue it over one day because I thought it was coming back 
to me for review and then I don't know whether or not Mr. 
Bernert bailed out. He must have bailed out. 
MR. SNIDER: He did. 
THE COURT: And then they issued a summons for a 
third degree felony which brought him back in before Judge 
Lyon. I did not know at that point at what point the State 
could go kings yx'. That was my concern as to whether or not 
the State could go kings yx' at that time and say, "Well, we 
didn't know what the record was. You were represented by Mr. 
Olds because at that time it was - and so I ordered it but I I 
never accepted it, in my opinion, Mr. Bernert's plea. Now I 
whether or not there were other factors that blocks that off, I j 
didn't know because the State - well, the city at that time, 
Mr. Olds said, "Well Judge, we don't want you to accept that | 
plea, this should have been filed as a third degree." He 
mumbled something that I couldn't make out from the tape about | 
the timing of one of the offenses. But looking at the record, 
it was clear to me that it was within the thing. So 
i 
objectively, legally, I'm of the opinion I did not accept his | 
i 
plea in that particular situation. You have pointed out a good! 
point. Maybe I ought to reconsider how I do things and make \ 
I 
the statement that the plea is accepted but I really felt that I 
i 
i 
I was not accepting this plea at that point. I was continuing I 
i 
it over to see what the State wanted to do and go from there. » 
MR. SNIDER: Okay. j 
I 
THE COURT: All right? Want it back to Judge Lyon? | 
MR. SNIDER: Back to Judge Lyon and we'll have it on | 
his calendar tomorrow. I 
i 
THE COURT: All right. Do you need to prepare an . 
i 
order to that effect? I think you do because I think it's j 
appealable issue eventually. , 
I 
MS. CORP: Yeah. I'm trying to decide if it could bej 
1 part of the ultimate or - it probably should be separate. 
2 THE COURT: We should probably prepare a separate 
3 i finding. He filed a motion. As to whether or not the Court 
4 I accepted the plea, the Court feels that although it didn't say 
5 J the magic words, that it did not accept the plea under the 
6 I circumstances and then you can go from there. 
7 I (Whereupon the hearing was concluded) 
8 ' 
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